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Abstract. How should a coalition of cooperating players allocate payo⁄s to
its members? This question arises in a broad range of situations and evokes
an equally broad range of issues. For example, it raises technical issues in
accounting, if the players are divisions of a corporation, but involves issues of
social justice when the context is how people behave in society.
Despite the breadth of possible applications, coalitional game theory o⁄ers
a uni￿ed framework and solutions for addressing such questions. This brief
survey presents some of its major models and proposed solutions.
1. Introduction
In their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced two
theories of games: strategic and coalitional. Strategic game theory concentrates
on the selection of strategies by payo⁄-maximizing players. Coalitional game theory
concentrates on coalition formation and the distribution of payo⁄s.
The next two examples illustrate situations in the domain of the coalitional
approach.
1.1. Games with no strategic structure.
Example 1. Cost allocation of a shared facility. Three municipalities, E,
W, and S, need to construct water puri￿cation facilities. Costs of individual and
joint facilities are described by the cost function c: c(E) = 20, c(W) = 30, and
c(S) = 50; c(E;W) = 40, c(E;S) = 60, and c(W;S) = 80; c(E;W;S) = 80. For
example, a facility that serves the needs of W and S would cost $80 million.
The optimal solution is to build, at the cost of 80, one facility that serves all
three municipalities. How should its cost be allocated?
1.2. Games with many Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Repeated sales. A seller and a buyer play the following stage game
on a daily basis. The seller decides on the quality level, H, M, or L, of the item
sold (at a ￿xed price); without knowledge of the seller￿ s selected quality, the buyer
decides whether or not to buy. If she does not buy, the payo⁄s of both are zero; if
she buys, the corresponding payo⁄s are (0,3), (3,2) or (4,0), depending on whether
the quality is H, M, or L.
Under perfect monitoring of past choices and low discounting of future payo⁄s,
the folk theorem of repeated games states that any pair of numbers in the convex
hull of (0,0),(0,3), (3,2), and (4,0) are Nash-equilibrium average payo⁄s. What
equilibrium and what average payo⁄s should they select?
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We proceed with a short survey of the major models and selected solution con-
cepts. More elaborate overviews are available in the entry Game Theory by Au-
mann (2008) in this dictionary, Myerson (1991), and other surveys mentioned below.
2. Types of coalitional games
In what follows, N is a ￿xed set of n players; the set of coalitions C consists
of the nonempty subsets of N; jSj denotes the number of players in a coalition
S. The terms "pro￿le" and "S-pro￿le" denote vectors of items (payo⁄s, costs,
commodities, etc.) indexed by the names of the players.
For every coalition S, RS denotes the jSj-dimensional Euclidean space indexed
by the names of the players; for single-player coalitions the symbol i replaces fig.
A pro￿le uS 2 RS denotes payo⁄s uS
i of the players i 2 S.
De￿nition 1. A game (also known as a game with no transferable utility, or NTU
game) is a function V that assigns every coalition S a set V (S) ￿ RS.
Remark 1. The initial models of coalitional games were presented in von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944) for the special case of TU games described below, Nash
(1950) for the special case of two-person games, and Aumann and Peleg (1960) for
the general case.
The interpretation is that V (S) describes all the feasible payo⁄ pro￿les that the
coalition S can generate for its members. Under the assumption that the grand
coalition N is formed, the central question is which payo⁄ pro￿le uN 2 V (N) to
select. Two major considerations come into play: the relative strength of di⁄erent
coalitions, and the relative strength of players within coalitions.
To separate these two issues, game theorists study the two simpler types of
games de￿ned below: TU games and bargaining games. In TU games the players in
every coalition are symmetric, so only the relative strength of coalitions matters. In
bargaining games only one coalition is active, so only the relative strength of players￿
within that coalition matters. Historically, solutions of games have been developed
￿rst for these simpler classes of games, and only then extended to general (NTU)
games. For this reason, the literature on these simpler classes is substantially richer
then the general theory of (NTU) games.
De￿nition 2. V is a transferable-utility game (TU game) if for a real-valued




It is customary to identify a TU game by the function v instead of V .
TU games describe many interactive environments. Consider, for example, any
environment with individual outcomes consisting of prizes p and monetary payo⁄s
m, and individual utilities that are additive and separable in money (ui(p;m) =
vi(p) + m). Under the assumption that the players have enough funds to make
transfers, the TU formulation presents an accurate description of the situation.
De￿nition 3. A Nash (1950) bargaining game is a two-person game. An n-person
bargaining game is a game V in which V (S) = ￿i2SV (i) for every coalition S $ N.
Remark 2. Partition games (Lucas and Thrall [1963]) use a more sophisticated
function V to describe coalitional payo⁄s. For every partition of the set of players
￿ = (T1;T2;:::;Tm), V￿(Tj) is the set of Tj￿ s feasible payo⁄ pro￿les, under the
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depend on the strategic alignment of the opponents. The literature on partition
games is not highly developed.
3. Some Special Families of Games
Coalitional game theory is useful for analyzing special types of interactive envi-
ronments. And conversely, such special environments serve as a laboratory to test
the usefulness of game theoretic solutions. The following are a few examples.
3.1. Pro￿t sharing and cost allocation. Consider a partnership that needs to
distribute its total pro￿ts, v(N), to its n individual partners. A pro￿t-distribution
formula should consider the potential pro￿ts v(S) that coalitions of partners S can
generate on their own. A TU game is a natural description of the situation.
A cost allocation problem, like Example 1, can be turned into a natural TU game
by de￿ning the worth of a coalition to be the savings obtained by joining forces:
v(S) =
P
i2S c(i) ￿ c(S).
Examples of papers on cost allocation are Shubik (1962) and Billera, Heath, and
Raanan (1978). See Young (1994) for an extensive survey.
3.2. Markets and auctions. Restricting this discussion to simple exchange, con-
sider an environment with n traders and m commodities. Each trader i starts
with an initial bundle !0
i, an m-dimensional vector that describes the quantities
of each commodity he owns. The utility of player i for a bundle !i is described





De￿nition 4. A game V is a market game, if for such an exchange environment
(with assumed free-disposal of utility),
V (S) = fuS 2 RS : for some S-feasible pro￿le of bundles !, uS
i ￿ ui(!i) for every
i 2 Sg.
Under the assumptions discussed earlier (additively separable utility and suf-
￿cient funds) the market game has the more compact TU description: v(S) =
max!
P
i2S ui(!i), with the max taken over all S-feasible pro￿les !.
As discussed below, market games play a central role in several areas of game
theory.
De￿nition 5. An auction game is a market game with a seller whose initial bundle
consists of items to be sold, and bidders whose initial bundles consist of money.
3.3. Matching games. Many theoretical and empirical studies are devoted to the
subject of e¢ cient and stable matching: husbands with wives, sellers with buyers,
students with schools, donors with receivers, and more; see the Matching entry
by Niederle, Roth, and Sonmez (2008) in this dictionary. The ￿rst of these was
introduced by Gale and Shapley in their pioneering study (1962) using the following
example.
Consider a matching environment with q males and q females. Payo⁄ functions
um(f) and um(none) describe the utilities of male m paired with female f or with
no one; uf(m) and uf(none) describe the corresponding utilities of the females. A
pairing PS of a coalition S is a speci￿cation of male-female pairs from S, with the
remaining S members being unpaired.4 EHUD KALAI
De￿nition 6. A game V is a marriage game if for such an environment, V (S) =
fuS 2 RS : for some pairing PS, uS
i ￿ ui(PS) for every i 2 Sg.
Solutions of marriage games that are e¢ cient and stable (i.e., no divorce) can
be computed by Gale-Shapley algorithms.
3.4. Optimization games. Optimization problems from operations research have
natural extensions to multiperson coalitional games, as the following examples il-
lustrate.
3.4.1. Spanning tree games. A cost-allocation TU spanning-tree game (Bird [1976])
is described by an undirected connected graph, with one node designated as the
center C and every other node corresponding to a player. Every arc has an asso-
ciated nonnegative connectivity cost. The cost of a coalition S, c(S), is de￿ned to
be the minimum sum of all the arc costs, taken over all subgraphs that connect all
the members of S to C.
3.4.2. Flow games. A TU ￿ ow game (Kalai and Zemel [1982b]) is described by a
directed graph, with two nodes, s and t, designated as the source and the sink,
respectively. Every arc has an associated capacity and is owned by one of the n
players. For every coalition S, v(S) is the maximal s-to-t ￿ ow that the coalition S
can generate through the arcs owned by its members.
3.4.3. Linear programming games. Finding minimal-cost spanning trees and max-
imum ￿ ow can be described as special types of linear programs. Linear (and
nonlinear) programming problems have been generalized to multiperson games (see
Owen [1975], Kalai and Zemel [1982a], and Dubey and Shapley [1984]). The fol-
lowing is a simple example.
Fix a p ￿ q matrix A and a q-dimensional vector w, to consider standard linear
programs of the form max wx s.t. Ax ￿ b. Endow each player i with a p-
dimensional vector bi, and de￿ne the linear-programming TU game v by v(S) =
maxx wx s.t. Ax ￿
P
i2S bi.
3.5. Simple games and voting games. A TU game is simple if for every coalition
S, v(S) is either zero or one. Simple games are useful for describing the power
of coalitions in political applications. For example, if every player is a party in a
certain parliament, then v(S) = 1 means that under the parliamentary rules the
parties in the coalition S have the ability to pass legislation (or win) regardless of
the positions of the parties not in S; v(S) = 0 (or S loses) otherwise.
In applications like the one above, just formulating the game may already o⁄er
useful insights into the power structure. For example, consider a parliament that
requires 50 votes in order to pass legislation, with three parties that have 12 votes,
38 votes, and 49 votes, respectively. Even though the third party seems strongest,
a simple formulation of the game yields the symmetric three-person majority game:
any coalition with two or more parties wins; single-party coalitions lose.
Beyond the initial stage of formulation, standard solutions of game theory o⁄er
useful insights into the power structure of such institutions and other political
structures; see, for example, Shapley and Shubik (1954), Riker and Shapley (1968),
and Brams et al. (1983).COALITIONAL GAMES 5
4. Solution Concepts
When cooperation is bene￿cial, which coalitions will form and how would coali-
tions allocate payo⁄s to their members? Given the breadth of situations for which
this question is relevant, game theory o⁄ers several di⁄erent solutions that are mo-
tivated by di⁄erent criteria. In this brief survey, we concentrate on the Core and
on the Shapley value.
Under the assumptions that utility functions can be rescaled, that lotteries over
outcomes can be performed, and that utility can be freely disposed of, we restrict
the discussion to games V with the following properties.
Every V (S) is a compact convex subset of the nonnegative orthant RS
+, and it
satis￿es the following property: if wS 2 RS
+ with wS ￿ uS for some uS 2 V (S),
then wS 2 V (S). And for single player coalitions, assume V (i) = f0g. For TU
games this means that every v(S) ￿ 0, the corresponding V (S) = fuS 2 RS
+ : P
i2S uS
i ￿ v(S)g, and for each i, v(i) = 0.
In addition, we assume that the games are superadditive: for any pair of disjoint
coalitions T and S, V (T [ S) ￿ V (T) ￿ V (S); for TU games this translates to
v(T [ S) ￿ v(T) + v(S). Under superadditivity, the maximal possible payo⁄s are
generated by the grand coalition N. Thus, the discussion turns to how the payo⁄s
of the grand coalition should be allocated, ignoring the question of which coalitions
would form.
A payo⁄pro￿le u 2 RN is feasible for a coalition S, if uS 2 V (S), where uS is the
projection of u to RS. The translation to TU games is that u(S) ￿
P
i2S ui ￿ v(S).
A pro￿le u 2 RN can be improved upon by the coalition S if there is an S-feasible
pro￿le w with wi > ui for all i 2 S.
De￿nition 7. An imputation of a game is a grand-coalition-feasible payo⁄ pro￿le
that is both individually rational (i.e., no individual player can improve upon it)
and Pareto optimal (i.e., the grand coalition cannot improve upon it).
Given the uncontroversial nature of individual rationality and Pareto optimality,
solutions of a game are restricted to the selection of imputations.
4.1. The core.
De￿nition 8. The core of a game (see Shapley [1952] and Gillies [1953] for TU,
and Aumann [1961] for NTU) is the set of imputations that cannot be improved
upon by any coalition.
The core turns out to be a compact set of imputations that may be empty. In
the case of TU games it is a convex set, but in general games (NTU) it may even
be a disconnected set. The core induces stable cooperation in the grand coalition
because no subcoalition of players can reach a consensus to break away when a
payo⁄ pro￿le is in the core.
Remark 3. More re￿ned notions of stability give rise to alternative solution con-
cepts, such as the stable sets of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and the
kernel and bargaining sets of Davis and Maschler (1965). The nucleolus of Schmei-
dler (1969), with its NTU extension in Kalai (1975), o⁄ers a "re￿nement" of the
core. It consists of a ￿nite number of points (exactly one for TU games) and
belongs to the core when the core is not empty. For more on these solutions, see
Maschler (1992) and the entry Game Theory by Aumann (2008) in this dictionary.6 EHUD KALAI
Unfortunately, games with an empty core are not unusual. Even the simple three-
person majority game described in 3.5 has an empty core (since among any three
numbers that sum to one there must be a pair that sums to less than one, there
are always two players who can improve their payo⁄s).
4.1.1. TU games with nonempty cores. Given the coalitional stability obtained un-
der payo⁄ pro￿les in the core, it is desirable to know in which games the core is
nonempty.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) consider "part-time coalitions" that meet
the availability constraints of their members. In this sense, a collection of nonnega-
tive coalitional weights ￿ = (￿S)S2C is balanced, if for every player i,
P
S:i2S ￿S = 1.
They show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game is balanced:
for every balanced collection ￿,
P
S ￿Sv(S) ￿ v(N).
As Scarf (1967) demonstrates, all market games have nonempty cores and even
the stronger property of having nonempty subcores: For every coalition S, consider
the subgame vS which is restricted to the players of S and their subcoalitions. The
game v has nonempty subcores, if all its subgames vS have nonempty cores.
By applying the balancedness condition repeatedly, one concludes that a game
has nonempty subcores if and only if the balancedness condition holds for all its
subgames vS. Games with this property are called totally balanced.
Since Shapley and Shubik (1969a) demonstrate the converse of Scarf￿ s result, a
game is thus totally balanced if and only if it is a market game. Interestingly, the
following description o⁄ers yet a di⁄erent characterization of this family of games.
A game w is additive if there is a pro￿le u 2 RN such that for every coalition S,
w(S) =
P
i2S ui. A game v is the minimum of a ￿nite collection of games (wr) if
for every coalition S, v(S) = minrwr(S).
Kalai and Zemel (1982b) show that a game has nonempty subcores if and only
if it is the minimum of a ￿nite collection of additive games. Moreover, a game is
such a minimum if and only if it is a ￿ ow game (as de￿ned in 3.4.2).
In summary, a game v in this important class of TU games can be characterized
by any of the following ￿ve equivalent statements: (1) v has nonempty subcores,
(2) v is totally balanced, (3) v is the minimum of additive games, (4) v is a market
game, (5) v is a ￿ ow game.
Scarf (1967), Billera and Bixby (1973), and the follow-up literature extend some
of the results above to general (NTU) games.
4.2. The Shapley TU Value.






N! [v(S) ￿ v(Sni)].
This expression describes the expected marginal contribution of player i to a
random coalition. To elaborate, imagine the players arriving at the game in a
random order. When player i arrives and joins the coalition of earlier arrivers S,
he is paid his marginal contribution to that coalition, i.e., v(S [ i) ￿ v(S). His
Shapley value ’i(v) is the expected value of this marginal contribution when all
orders of arrivals are equally likely.
Owen (1972) describes a parallel continuous-time process in which each player
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with "fractionally present" players, and considers the instantaneous marginal con-
tributions of each player i to such fractional coalitions. The Shapley value of player
i is the integral of his instantaneous marginal contributions, when all the players
arrive simultaneously at a constant rate over the same ￿xed time interval.
This continuous-time arrival model, when generalized to coalitional games with
in￿nitely many players, leads to the de￿nition of Aumann-Shapley prices. These
are useful for the allocation of production costs to di⁄erent goods produced in a
nonseparable joint production process (see Tauman [1988] and Young [1994]).
A substantial literature is devoted to extensions and variations of the axioms that
Shapley (1953) used to justify his value. These include extensions to in￿nitely many
players and to general (NTU) games (discussed brie￿ y below), and to nonsymmetric
values (see Weber [1988], Kalai and Samet [1987], and Levy and McLean [1991],
among others).
Is the Shapley value in the core of the game? Not always. But as Shapley (1971)
shows, if the game is convex, meaning that v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) ￿ v(S) + v(T) for
every pair of coalitions S and T, then the Shapley value and all the n! pro￿les of
marginal contributions (obtained under di⁄erent orders of arrival) are in the core.
Moreover, Ichiishi (1981) shows that the converse is also true.
We will turn to notions of value for NTU games after we describe solutions to
the special case of two-person NTU games, i.e., the Nash bargaining problem.
4.3. Solutions to Nash bargaining games. Nash (1950) pioneered the study of
NTU games when he proposed a model of a two-person bargaining game and, using
a small number of appealing principles, axiomatized the solution below.
Fix a two-person game V and for every imputation u de￿ne the payo⁄ gain of
player i by gaini(u) = ui ￿ v(i), with v(i) being the highest payo⁄ that player i
can obtain on his own, i.e., in his V (i).
De￿nition 10. The Nash bargaining solution is the unique imputation u that
maximizes the product of the gains of the two players, gain1(u) ￿ gain2(u).
Twenty ￿ve years later, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and others showed that
other appealing axioms lead to alternative solutions, like the two de￿ned below.
The ideal gain of player i is Ii = maxugaini(u), the maximum taken over all
imputations u.
De￿nition 11. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique imputation u with
payo⁄ gains proportional to the players￿ideal gains, gain1(u)=gain2(u) = I1=I2.
De￿nition 12. The egalitarian solution of Kalai (1977) is the unique imputation
u that equalizes the gains of the players, gain1(u) = gain2(u).
For additional solutions, including these of Rai⁄a (1953) and Perles and Maschler
(1981), see the comprehensive surveys of Lensberg and Thomson (1989) and Thom-
son (1994).
4.4. Values of NTU games. Three di⁄erent extensions of the Shapley TU value
have been proposed for NTU games: the Shapley value (extension), proposed by
Shapley (1969) and axiomatized by Aumann (1985); the Harsanyi value, proposed
by Harsanyi (1963) and axiomatized by Hart (1985); and the egalitarian value,
proposed and axiomatized by Kalai and Samet (1985).8 EHUD KALAI
All three proposed extensions coincide with the original Shapley value on the
class of TU games. For the class of NTU bargaining games, however, the (extended)
Shapley value and the Harsanyi value coincide with the Nash bargaining solution,
while the egalitarian value coincides with the egalitarian bargaining solution.
For additional material (beyond the brief discussion below) on these and related
solutions, see McLean (2002).
4.5. Axiomatic characterizations. The imposition of general principles, or ax-
ioms, often leads to a unique determination of a solution. This approach is repeat-
edly used in game theory, as illustrated by the short summary below.
4.5.1. Nash￿ s axioms. Nash (1950) characterizes his bargaining solution by the fol-
lowing axioms: individual rationality, symmetry, Pareto optimality, invariance to
utility scale, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
Invariance to utility scale means that changing the scale of the utility of a player
does not change the solution. But this axiom goes further by disallowing all
methods that use information extraneous to the game, even if such methods are
invariant to scale.
Nash￿ s IIA axiom requires that a solution that remains feasible when other payo⁄
pro￿les are removed from the feasible set should not be altered.
4.5.2. Shapley￿ s axioms. Shapley (1953) characterizes his TU value by the following
axioms: symmetry, Pareto optimality, additivity, and dummy player.
A value is additive if in a game that is the sum of two games, the value of each
player equals the sum of his values in the two component games.
A dummy player, i.e., one who contributes nothing to any coalition, should be
allocated no payo⁄.
4.5.3. Monotonicity axioms. Monotonicity axioms describe notions of fairness and
induce incentives to cooperate. The following are a few examples.
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) characterize their bargaining solution using indi-
vidual monotonicity: a player￿ s payo⁄ should not be reduced if the set of imputa-
tions is expanded to improve his possible payo⁄s.
Kalai (1977) and Kalai and Samet (1985) characterize their egalitarian solutions
using coalitional monotonicity: expanding the feasible set of one coalition should
not reduce the payo⁄s of any of its members.
Thomson (1983) uses population monotonicity to characterize the n-person Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution: in dividing ￿xed resources among n players, no player should
bene￿t if more players are added to share the same resources.
Perles and Maschler (1981) characterize their bargaining solution using superad-
ditivity (used also in Myerson [1981]): if a bargaining problem is to be randomly
drawn, all the players bene￿t by reaching agreement prior to knowing the realized
game.
Young (1985) shows that Shapley￿ s TU additivity axiom can be replaced by
strong monotonicity: a player￿ s payo⁄ can only depend on his marginal contribu-
tions to his coalitions, and it has to be monotonically nondecreasing in these.
4.5.4. Axiomatizations of NTU values. The NTU Shapley value is axiomatized in
Aumann (1985) by adapting Shapley￿ s TU axioms to the NTU setting, and combin-
ing them with Nash￿ s IIA axiom. Di⁄erent adaptations lead to an axiomatization
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(1985) use coalitional monotonicity and a weak version of additivity to axiomatize
the NTU egalitarian value.
For more information on axiomatizations of NTU values, see McLean (2002).
4.5.5. Consistency axioms. Consistency axioms relate the solution of a game to the
solutions of "subgames" obtained when some of the players leave the game with
their share of the payo⁄. Authors who employ consistency axioms include: Davis
and Maschler (1965) for the bargaining set, Peleg (1985, 1986, and 1992) for the
core, Lensberg (1988) for the Nash n-person bargaining solution, Kalai and Samet
(1987) and Levy and McLean (1991) for TU- and NTU-weighted Shapley values,
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) for the TU Shapley value, and Bhaskar and Kar (2004)
for cost allocation in spanning trees.
5. Bridging strategic and coalitional models
Several theoretical bridges connect strategic and coalitional models. Aumann
(1961) o⁄ers two methods for reducing strategic games to coalitional games. Such
reductions allow one to study speci￿c strategic games, such as repeated games, from
the perspectives of various coalitional solutions, such as the core.
One substantial area of research is the Nash program, designed to o⁄er strategic
foundations for various coalitional solution concepts. In Nash (1953), he began
by constructing a strategic bargaining procedure, and showing that the strategic
solution coincides with the coalitional Nash bargaining solution. We refer the
reader to the entry on the Nash Program in this dictionary (Serrano [2008]) for a
survey of the extensive literature that followed.
Network games and coalition formation are the subjects of a growing literature.
Amending a TU game with a communication graph, Myerson (1977) develops a
appropriate extension of the Shapley Value. Using this extended value, Aumann
and Myerson (1988) construct a dynamic strategic game of links formation that
gives rise to stable communication graphs. For a survey of the large follow-up lit-
erature in this domain, see the entry Network Formation in this dictionary (Jackson
[2008]).
Networks also o⁄er a tool for the study of market structures. For example, Kalai,
Postlewaite, and Roberts (1979) compare a market game with no restrictions to a
star-shaped market, where all trade must ￿ ow through one middleman. Somewhat
surprisingly, their comparisons of the cores of the corresponding games reveal the
existence of economies in which becoming a middleman can only hurt a player.
Recent studies of strategic models of auctions point to interesting connections
with the coalitional model. For example, empirical observations suggest that the
better performing auctions are the ones with outcomes in the core of the corre-
sponding coalitional game. For related references, see Bikhchandani and Ostroy
(2006), De Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2007), and Day and Milgrom (2007).
6. Large cooperative games
When the number of players is large, the exponential number of possible coali-
tions makes the coalitional analysis di¢ cult. On the other hand, in games with
many players each individual has less in￿ uence and the laws of large numbers reduce
uncertainties.10 EHUD KALAI
Unfortunately, the substantial fascinating literature on games with many players
is too large to survey here, so the reader is referred to Aumann and Shapley (1974)
and Neyman (2002) for the theory of the Shapley value of large games, and to
Shapley and Shubik (1969a), Wooders and Zame (1984), Anderson (1992), Kannai
(1992), and the entry Core Convergence (Anderson [2008]) in this dictionary, for
the theory of cores of large games .
A surprising discovery drawn from the above literature is a phenomenon unique
to large market games that has become known as the equivalence theorem: when
applied to large market games, the predictions of almost all (with the notable excep-
tion of the von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets) major solution concepts (in both
coalitional and strategic game theory) coincide. Moreover, they all prescribe the
economic price equilibrium as the solution for the game. This theorem presents the
culmination of many papers, including Debreu and Scarf (1963), Aumann (1964),
Shapley (1964), Shapley and Shubik (1969a) and Aumann (1975).
7. Directions for future work
Consider, for example, the task of constructing of a pro￿t-sharing formula for
a large consulting ￿rm that has many partners with di⁄erent expertise, located in
o¢ ces around the world. While a coalitional approach should be suitable for the
task, several current shortcomings limit its applicability. These include:
1. Incomplete information. Partners may have incomplete di⁄erential
information about the feasible payo⁄s of di⁄erent coalitions. While coalitional
game theory has some literature on this subject (see Harsanyi and Selten [1972],
Myerson [1984], and the follow-up literature), it is not nearly as developed as its
strategic counterpart.
2. Dynamics. Although the feasible payo⁄s of coalitions vary with time, coali-
tional game theory is almost entirely static.
3. Computation. Even with a moderate number of players, the information
needed for describing a game is very demanding. The literature on the complexity
of computing solutions (as in Deng and Papadimitriou [1994] and Nisan et al.
[2007]) is growing. But overall, coalitional game theory is still far from o⁄ering
readily computable solution concepts for complex problems like the pro￿t-sharing
formula in the situation described above.
Further research on the topics above would be an invaluable contribution to
coalitional game theory.
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